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Art vs Craft:





Abstract. Standards for expert testimony in England &Wales have long been de-
scribed as laissez-faire and in desperate need of reform, with decisions about ad-
missibility being left entirely to the trial judge (Turner 2009) and numerous calls
for legislation going unheeded. Rules for the methods and content of an expert’s
written and oral evidence therefore derive entirely from common law together with
the publications of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR). With extensive reference
to a recent murder trial involving determining the meaning of a particular Urban
British English lexical item where I had the rare opportunity to watch an opposing
expert in action, this paper discusses current requirements and the obstacles these
may present for the delivery of justice. The implications of admitting expertise in
the form of unstructured, unquantiable art alongside that which adopts a rigor-
ous, replicable craft-like approach are drawn out in relation to this case and to the
law as it stands. The paper concludes with a two-pronged solution for addressing
these issues. Firstly, a dedicated training programme or system of guidance to
enable judges to identify reliable expertise is proposed. Secondly addressing the
‘widespread ignorance’ (Heydon 2020) in the legal system of lesser-known elds
of scholarship (such as forensic linguistics) is identied as a key strategy for im-
proving standards of expert evidence.
Keywords: Expert evidence, determining meaning, standards, drill.
Resumo. Há muito que as normas aplicáveis a perícias em Inglaterra e no País
de Gales são descritas como sendo tipicamente “laissez-faire” e como carecendo
urgentemente de reforma, uma vez que as decisões sobre admissibilidade cam
inteiramente nas mãos do juiz (Turner 2009) e os inúmeros pedidos de legislação
são ignorados. As regras relativas aos métodos e conteúdo de uma perícia oral e
escrita decorrem integralmente da “common law”, em conjunto com as publicações
do regulador de ciências forenses (FSR, Forensic Science Regulator). Fazendo ex-
tensiva referência a um julgamento recente de homicídio que exigiu a análise de
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signicados para determinar o signicado de um vocábulo de inglês britânico ur-
bano no qual tive a rara oportunidade de ver o perito da outra parte em ação,
este artigo discute os atuais requisitos e obstáculos que estes podem representar
para a administração de justiça. Avalia-se as implicações subjacentes à admissão
de perícias de forma não estruturada e não quanticável, em paralelo com perí-
cias que adotam uma abordagem rigorosa e replicável, no contexto deste caso e
e no contexto da lei. O artigo termina com a proposta de uma solução bifaseada
para resolver estas questões. Primeiro, propõe-se um programa de formação ou sis-
tema de orientação dedicado para permitir aos juizes identicar perícias áveis.
Em segundo lugar, a “ignorância generalizada” (Heydon 2020) no sistema judi-
cial relativamente a áreas de conhecimento menos conhecidas (como a linguística
forense) é identicada como uma estratégia crucial para melhorar os padrões de
aprovisionamento de perícia.
Palavras-chave: Prova pericial, análise de signicados, normas, exercício.
Introduction
In England & Wales the provision of expert evidence in criminal proceedings is legislated
for by section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which states merely that ‘an expert
report shall be admissible as evidence’ and that ‘if it is proposed that the person making
the report shall not give oral evidence, the report shall only be admissible with the leave
of the court’. The question of who qualies as an expert and what qualies as expertise
remains undened in statute.
Perhaps unsurprising then that expert evidence in this jurisdiction has been de-
scribed as being admitted ‘too readily’ and ‘with insucient scrutiny’ with a ‘laissez-
faire’ approach (Law Commission 2011; Hodgkinson and James 2020), and these con-
cerns have led to a number of attempts to reform the law relating to expert evidence,
with the Law Commission (2011) and later the Forensic Science Regulator (2019) calling
for admissibility to be put on a statutory footing. Ward and Fouladvand (2021) alert us to
the ‘very real’ danger of ‘unbalanced anecdotal experience being accepted as expertise’,
warning that courts need to take more seriously the new and more rigorous approach
to expert evidence that was supposed to result from s.19A of the Criminal Practice Di-
rections originally issued in 2015 (Amendment No. 11 (2020) EWCA Crim 1347 ) (hereafter
CPD 2020).
Despite calls for legislation on the matter of expert evidence, in England and Wales
common law remains the only source of criteria for assessing its admissibility (for exam-
ple, National Justice Cia Naviera SA v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer)
(1993) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68; R v. Bowman (2006) EWCA Crim 417). Indeed, there has been
explicit resistance against any moves to impose a standard admissibility test: ‘so long
as the eld [of expertise] is suciently well-established to pass the ordinary tests of
relevance and reliability, then no enhanced test of admissibility should be applied, but
the weight of the evidence should be established by the same adversarial forensic tech-
niques applicable elsewhere’ (Munday 2018: 523). There are a number of concerns with
this position, which this paper goes on to explore.
Most recently the Forensic Science Regulator (2021b) publishing an Appendix to
their Codes of Practice and Conduct (CPC) setting out to standardise approaches to
expressing expert opinion across disciplines. Aside from these CPC the only binding
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obligations for experts for both Prosecution and Defence are those set out in Part 19 of
the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 (Amended 2020) (hereafter CrPR 2020) – a statutory
instrument enabled by the Courts Act (2003) – and the aforementioned CPD which it
supplements.
This paper summarises the requirements laid out in these documents and discusses
movements towards standardisation, before illustrating the challenges surrounding the
provision of expert evidence in England & Wales with reference to a genuine murder
case with which the author was involved in March 2021. The case perfectly illustrated
two diametrically opposed understandings of the nature of ‘expertise’: on the one hand
as an art, the result of some supposed innate understanding, and on the other as craft,
with an emphasis on the correct application of particular tools and skills to produce
entirely replicable results.
The paper concludes with some thoughts on the issues at hand, and suggestions for
how the situation might be improved.
The admissibility of expert evidence
Common law holds that expert evidence is admissible if it fulls the following criteria
(CPD 2020):
(i) it is relevant to a matter in issue in the proceedings;
(ii) it is needed to provide the court with information likely to be outside the court’s
own knowledge and experience; and
(iii) the witness is competent to give that opinion.
The rst criterion seems fairly straightforward, dealing as it does with the requirement
that expert evidence can only be provided by someone who is an expert in the relevant
eld (see O’Brien (Respondent) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Appellant) (2005)
UKHL 26; R v Barnes (2005) EWCA Crim 1158). As we shall see, however, the matter of
which eld is the relevant eld is seemingly not clear-cut in all cases. R v Turner (1975)
1 All ER 70 provides one of the most widely cited explanations of the second criterion,
that being that an expert would be required only where they would ‘furnish the court
with scientic information that was likely to be outside the experience and knowledge
of the judge or jury’.
On the matter of the third criterion, paragraph 19A.4 CPD (2020) encourages courts
to enquire into factors around the reliability of an expert and be satised that the evi-
dence has a suciently reliable scientic basis before admitting it (R vDlugosz and Others
(2013) EWCA Crim 2) and also lists a number of factors they may take into account to
determine this. These includes the extent and quality of data upon which the expert
relies, the extent to which their methods have been subjected to peer review, and the
extent to which their opinion is based on material falling outside their eld of expertise
(19A.5). CPD (2020) further advises courts to be ‘astute to identify potential aws’ and
includes among these insuciently scrutinised hypotheses, awed data, and relying on
inferences or conclusions that have not been properly reached (19A.6).
CrPR 19.2 (3) (d) requires the expert to notify those instructing them, who in turn
must notify the court in order to assist in making such an assessment as detailed above,
anything ‘which might reasonably be thought capable of— (i) undermining the reliability
of the expert’s opinion, or (ii) detracting from the credibility or impartiality of the expert’
45
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(CrPR 19.3 (3) (c)). This might relate to lack of accreditation, or to a history of inadequate
methods or failure to observe recognised standards (CPD 2020 : 19A.7). We return to the
obligations of the expert in the next section.
Expert evidence is an exception to the rule that witnesses’ testimony must be ev-
idence only of fact and not of opinion (Hodgkinson and James 2020; Forensic Science
Regulator 2021b), an exception statutorily preserved in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.
118 (1) 8, which states that an expert witness may ‘draw on the body of expertise relevant
to his eld’, i.e., on information provided by others, which under other circumstances
would be excluded as hearsay evidence. As Ward and Fouladvand (2021) point out, we
can nd some courts interpreting ‘body of expertise’ more broadly than it was in Dlu-
gosz, acknowledging that the best informed witnesses will often be people who have
gained expertise not through academic or professional training but because their work
or experiences bring them into contact with the criminal activity at issue, for example
the police (e.g. Myers v R (2015) UKPC 40) and – crucially for the purposes of this paper
– even people who have gained expertise through a criminal career of their own (e.g. R
v Chatwood (1980) 1 WLR 874).
The lack of statutory intervention and the insistence that ‘no enhanced test of ad-
missibility should be applied’ (Munday 2018: 580) has been explained by some as a result
of judicial reluctance to identify a suitably recognised body of knowledge before admit-
ting evidence, particularly when some disciplines develop at such an advanced rate. The
result of this reluctance has been the admission of non-expert evidence in a range of ar-
eas including handwriting analysis (R v Silverlock (1894) 2 QB 766) and voice comparison
(R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 161), and a general acceptance as described above that
witnesses who have gained their expertise through advanced familiarity with a topic
rather than formal education are entirely capable of fullling the required criterion of
furnishing the jury with information outside of their knowledge (Ward and Fouladvand
2021; see also R v Byrne (2021) EWCA Crim 107).
This leads us to a very specic problem: if a jury have been assessed as incapable
of deciding some matter at issue without the assistance of an expert, how are they ex-
pected to do so when presented with two alternative expert opinions, particularly when
there is no formal regulation of the provision of such evidence? This is a long-discussed
contradiction in theory (see Hand 1901), and in practice this exact tension has led to the
evidence of experts for both sides being excluded (R v Edwards (2001) EWCA Crim 2185).
We return to this challenge later.
We must also consider that the jury’s level of scientic knowledge may be such as
to severely impede its understanding of the expert evidence that is given. The danger is
that the jury, lacking condence in its own abilities to assign the appropriate weight to
the evidence it hears, accepts the opinion of the expert who gives their evidence most
convincingly, rather than being assisted to reach its own conclusions (Roberts and Zuck-
erman 2010). This latter point, of course, could arguably be applied to the adversarial
system in its entirety, but appears magnied in the context of expert opinion, which may
be shrouded in mystery as far as the jury is concerned.
The trend for admitting expert evidence and allowing it to be tested by the usual
‘adversarial forensic techniques’ also suers from the drawback that, frequently, the de-
fence does not obtain its own expert evidence in rebuttal of a prosecution expert. Reasons
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for this are largely nancial – the Legal Aid Agency (2020), on whom many defendants
rely for nancial support, are bound by the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regu-
lations 2013 as amended, which sets rates for expert witnesses’ payment (interestingly,
while ‘voice recognition’ is listed as a recognised expertise, ‘linguistics’ does not appear,
and the allowable rate for linguists is thus determined on a case-by-case basis). The pros-
ecution is not bound in such a way, having almost limitless resources, and thus many
experts nd themselves, perhaps understandably, taking on more prosecution work than
defence.
Financial constraints are not the only limitation to a defence team’s ability to call
on the services of expert witnesses. There is also the matter of access; while police
forces across the UK have access to the National Crime Agency’s (NCA) Expert Ad-
viser’s database, no register of equal scope is accessible for defence solicitors. There
are a number of agencies, such as The Medical Expert Witness Alliance (MEWA)1 who
charge the client as fee on top of that charged by the expert; and there are a number of
registers, such as The Academy of Experts2 and the UK Register of Expert Witnesses3
which require payment of a fee from the expert themselves, as well as testimonials from
previous clients, in order to join. These databases are open for anyone to search. While
it could be argued that the requirement for a fee ensures a high-quality membership, it
is undeniably something of a barrier as compared to the free-of-charge NCA register,
which requires simply a one-o reference and annually updated CV. Thus, many ex-
perts rely on word-of-mouth in order to pick up defence work – the case reported on
below came my way as a result of the involvement of a cultural scholar with whom I
had happened to converse at the end of an academic talk she gave. Had that serendipi-
tous meeting not occurred, and had she not been moved to recommend me on becoming
aware of the facts of the case, then the prosecution evidence described below would have
proceeded entirely uncontested from a linguistic perspective – as, one presumes, it does
in courtrooms across the country on a regular basis.
Obligations of the Expert
According to section 19.2 of the CrPR (2020), an expert must help the court by giving
opinion which is (i) objective and unbiased, and (ii) within the expert’s area or areas of
expertise. The duty overrides any obligation to the party from whom the expert receives
instruction and/or payment. General legal obligations of the expert are set out in more
detail by the Forensic Science Regulator (2020b).
Drawing on the CPD (2020) and the CrPR (2020) as well as a number of judgments,
FSR (2020a) sets out the legal requirements for an expert report in guidance supplemen-
tary to its Codes of Practice and Conduct (discussed below). FSR (2020b) notes that while
Section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 details the requirements of a written statement,
including the declaration of truth that must accompany all written statements submitted
in evidence, there is no statutory prescription for the contents of an expert report. How-
ever, CrPR (2020) provides a list of issues that an expert report must cover, including
19.4 (f) requiring the expert to:
• where there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the report —-
(i) summarise the range of opinion, and (ii) give reasons for the expert’s own
opinion’,
and (j) requiring that expert reports:
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• contain a statement that the expert understands an expert’s duty to the court,
and has complied and will continue to comply with that duty.
A suggested wording for the statements of understanding and declarations is provided
in section 19B of the CPD, and includes, inter alia, a conrmation that the expert has
read and complied with Part 19 of CrPR and a conrmation that they have acted in
accordance with the code of practice or conduct for experts of their discipline (see also
para. 28.2 of the Forensic Science Regulator (2021a: 83). CPD 19B further stipulates that
in the case of prosecution witnesses, they must conrm that they have read and followed
the guidance relating to disclosure set out in CPS (2019) and complied with their duties
under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.
CrPR 19.6 and CPD 19C deal with the phenomenon often referred to colloquially as
‘hot-tubbing’, whereby at the direction of the court experts instructed by both parties in
a trial are required to discuss the issues at hand in order to establish the extent to which
they agree and formulate short descriptions of points on which they do not. They are
then required to provide a joint statement to this eect.
Let us return now to the matter of expressing one’s opinion, as it relates to the
expert’s obligations to the court. A landmark case in this area was that of R v Atkins
(2009) EWCA Crim 1876, in which an appeal was brought against conviction on the
basis that a facial recognition expert’s evidence for the prosecution had been expressed
using a sliding scale of propositions – not dissimilar from that set out in Coulthard et al.
(2017: 197) and adopted by a number of forensic linguists practicing around the globe.
In Atkins the appellants argued that the expert’s expressions of likelihood should not
have been put before the jury, and that instead they should have been presented with
the similarities and dierences and left to draw their own conclusions. This position was
rejected by the appeal judge, who, although cautioning against numerical expressions
of opinion, stated that:
leaving the jury to make up its own mind as to the similarities and dissimilarities,
with no assistance at all as to their signicance, would be to give the jury raw
material with no means of evaluating it. It would be as likely to result in over-
valuation as under-valuation. It would be more, not less, likely to result in an
unsafe conclusion than providing the jury with the expert’s opinion, properly
debated through cross-examination. . .
He further added that should the expression of opinion be inadmissible it would, in
eect, nullify all expert testimony. It would of course be impossible to cross-examine
an expert about the signicance of certain facial similarities if they had been prevented
from providing their opinion on their signicance in the rst instance. Considered with
the point made earlier about jurors’ condence in their abilities to interpret scientic
testimony, this represents an important balancing act as far as the presentation of expert
opinion is concerned.
In the wake of several high-prole miscarriages of justice in England, including the
convictions of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four, and those of mothers of ba-
bies who had died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) (Campbell and Walker 2007),
the regulation of expert testimony had established itself rmly at the top of the criminal
justice agenda by the late 1990s. The Council for the Registration of Forensic Practi-
tioners (CRFP) was established in 1999 (Kershaw 2000) in an attempt to restore public
condence in forensic practice but disbanded following cuts to government funding in
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2009. Despite denials from the Home Oce, the disbandment was widely regarded as
presenting a genuine blow for justice, given the CRFP’s role in ‘sifting rogue scientists’4.
Many of the responsibilities of the CRFP then passed to the newly established oce
of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR), an independent agency responsible for leading
on the development of quality standards and advising providers on matters of compli-
ance. Over the past ten years the FSR has published seven issues of their Codes of Prac-
tice and Conduct (CPC) for forensic science providers. The CPC set standards that are to
be adhered to by both sides in criminal cases, and despite the FSR’s lack of any statutory
powers, these are mandatory. From the rst issue, the FSR state that ‘standards are not
intended to stie innovation’ and ‘the courts will always be free to consider evidence
derived from methods. . . [where] there simply hasn’t been time to include the technique
in their scope of accreditation’ (Forensic Science Regulator 2011: 2). The FSR is thus
clearly cognizant of judicial unwillingness to impose any ‘enhanced test of admissibil-
ity’ as discussed earlier.
One obligation listed in this rst outing of the CPC is that an expert should ‘seek
access to exhibits/productions/information that may have a signicant impact on your
ndings’ (2011: 9) and this remains in the most current guidance at time of writing
(Forensic Science Regulator 2021a: 19). Further stipulations include taking ‘reasonable
steps to maintain and develop your professional competence’ and to ‘act. . . only within
the limits of your professional competence’ (Forensic Science Regulator 2021a: 19). The
requirements of an expert witness are thus readily available in a range of easily acces-
sible locations. The FSR are also responsible for the latest available guidance specic to
expressing evaluative opinion, published as an Appendix to the CPC in 2021 (Forensic
Science Regulator 2021b). The document sets out to standardise the provision of expert
opinion across disciplines and enhance the transparency and understanding of opinion
evidence in the courts, explicitly naming authorship analysis and speech science on its
list of scientic areas to which the guidance applies. This appears to be the rst formal
attempt to regulate forensic linguistic testimony – albeit only two tasks from the vast
range that linguists are called upon to engage with – since the Forensic Linguistics (Stan-
dards) Bill (2016), which did not make it past its rst reading in the House of Commons.
Forensic Science Regulator (2021b) calls for, among other things, a standard verbal scale
of likelihood to be adopted across disciplines.
On the meaning of killy: a case study of linguistic expertise
In February 2021 I was approached by a defence solicitor whose client – I later found out
– was on trial for murder along with two of his acquaintances. The solicitor asked me to
read and respond to a set of three expert reports that had been authored in June, July, and
October 2020 by a Mr X, who had been instructed by the police to provide interpretations
of a range of material, including music videos, handwritten notes, instant messages,
voice messages, and transcribed phonecalls, much of which was in a variety of English
that linguists would call Multicultural London English (MLE) or Urban British English
(UBE) (see Drummond 2016), but which Mr X consistently referred to in his reports (and
later in the witness box) as ‘street slang’. ‘Slang’ is a term that lacks useful denition
(Dumas and Lighter 1978) as well as imposing an arguably negative value judgment.
Thus, outside of quoting other sources, I will instead make use of the label UBE. The
defendants and their associates were also fans, and sometime amateur artists, in the
world of drill music: a genre of hip hop characterised by violent lyrical content set to
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sparse accompaniment which originated in Chicago in 2010, entered the UK via Brixton,
South London in 2012, and has established scenes in London and Toronto, among other
places in the English-speaking world.
According to the preamble in his report, Mr X’s expertise derived from his lived ex-
periences as a member of a street gang some twenty years prior for which he had spent
some time in prison. On release he had begun working in the area of safeguarding, ed-
ucating both young people and the professionals who work with them on the dangers
and warning signs of involvement in gang culture. He had established a charity to carry
out such work, and through this made connections with the local police force who made
use of his services for training, working with young people, and, it would seem, inter-
preting the language of communications in suspected gang-related cases. None of the
reports contained the statement of understanding and complying with duty to the court,
a requirement under CrPr 19.4(j), and certainly did not state compliance with CrPR 19
itself nor with any code of practice, as required by CPD 19B.
The defence solicitor presented me with two tasks: one, to review Mr X’s interpreta-
tion of a particular word, killy, as it appeared in two transcribed phone calls (note these
calls had been transcribed by the police and Mr X was not given access to the audio; we
will revisit this point later). Mr X had interpreted this word to mean the feeling of want-
ing to kill. I was to produce a report of my ndings to be served in the trial. Secondly,
I was asked to examine the remainder of Mr X’s reports and provide a review, purely
for the use of the defence team. The triangulation of methods I used to address the rst
of these tasks will be familiar to readers who have encountered the work of Grant (e.g.
2017) in the eld of ascertaining meaning in forensic contexts.
The two instances of killy on which I was asked to focus were the following, both
contained within transcriptions of phonecalls where one party was on remand in prison:
1. [rst utterance of the call] Ay yo yo my killy do
2. Calm calm calm. Hey listen man its my fucking killy. I’m gonna call you M innit, I
love you man yeah love you my fucking bro. Come on bro ***inaudible*** baboosh.
With traditional print reference sources on interpretations of ‘slang’ being of no use in
this instance, my rst port of call was Urbandictionary.com. It goes without saying that
an online reference source comprised solely of community contributions and relying on
its membership to ‘upvote’ and ‘downvote’ those contributions as the only indicator of
their validity is not without its limitations. It is, of course, susceptible to inaccuracy,
incompleteness, and potentially even manipulation. Furthermore, it is impossible to de-
termine geographical origins of denitions or their upvotes. Nevertheless, it provides
us with a legitimate springboard for deeper analysis. As Grant (2017) points out, the
contributors of denitions and votes to such sites can be reasonably assumed to belong
to a community of practice who uses the variety; it would be ‘wrong to ignore [wikidic-
tionaries’] unmediated connection to language users’ (2017: 9).
The top ranked denition for killy on Urbandictionary.com at time of writing, with
a total of 121 upvotes and just four downvotes, is a very close friend that you trust. The
example sentence provided is
J1 is my Killy you know, known man from young still.
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The use of man as a pronoun (Hall 2020) and the utterance-nal still (sometimes spelled
styll) (Denis 2016) tell us that this example is UBE, or at least a West Indian-inuenced
variety – much like the variety under discussion in this case. This is not an example from
some far-removed linguistic variety that is markedly dierent from that the individuals
are using in the questioned materials – it is entirely comparable, and thus relevant to
our interpretation.
Some much lower ranking denitions did include a force similar to that which Mr X
had attributed: A feeling of wanting to kill multiple people for being shitbags, but knowing
you can’t and won’t do it (12 up, 7 down) and an expressed need or feel to be morbid or kill
someone imaginary (2 up, 5 down). The UK slang dictionary Genius.com provides the
further information that while in the original Jamaican patois killy refers to a killer, it
states that in London it is a term most commonly used to refer to a close friend or gang
member.
Of course, dictionary sources are not enough. The next step was to examine the
use of killy on Twitter. Rather than focussed explanations of meaning as we see on
urbandictionary.com, the instances of the lexical item on Twitter are genuine, naturally-
occurring examples of language in use, and thus have privileged status over elicited data
(Potter 1997; Johnstone 2000).
Scraping Twitter for mentions of killy between the 9th and 17th of March 2021 using
QSR NCapture resulted in around 1650 results. A substantial proportion of these were
not helpful – either the word was contained in the username, e.g. emily_killy, the tweet
referred to the Canadian rapper Killy, the Star Trek character Captain Killy, the anime
character Killy, the area of Newcastle-upon-Tyne Killingworth, or used killy as a port-
manteau of the names Kelly Monaco and Billy Miller, onscreen spouses in the US soap
opera General Hospital, who apparently have a minor online fanbase. Manual removal of
such entries left a corpus of 579 tweets, which with the help of WordSmith Tools (Scott
2020) were explored to determine the senses in which the item was being used. The vast
majority of the concordance lines represent a denition of killy as akin to ‘close friend’,
as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 below.
Figure 1. Selected ‘my killy’ concordance lines
Figure 2. Selected ‘you/young/your killy’ concordance lines
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Collocations with famlee (Figure 1, line 322) and constructions like you know who your
killy’s are (Figure 2, line 581) present a straightforward equivalence between killy and
friend.
So too is there evidence for the other denition discovered on Urbandictionary.com
and named by Mr X as the only interpretation, i.e. as an adjective describing the state of
wanting to kill, or having a proclivity to do so:
Figure 3. Selected ‘all/and killy’ concordance lines
Attributing the characteristic to murderers (line 29) and the pairing of killy with scary
and rapy (lines 31 and 35) clearly demonstrates this adjectival use. However, it should
be stated that unlike the tweets that use killy to mean friend, there is nothing in the
tweets using the adjectival killy that suggests the authors are part of a community that
uses UBE. For this community at least, the overriding denition of the word appears to
be akin to close friend. This interpretation also ts with the context of the word in the
two extracts – following the greeting ay yo yo and within an utterance which is clearly
designed to bring reassurance – calm calm - to the hearer about the speaker’s solidarity
with them - I love you man yeah love you my fucking bro. It occupies a nominal position
and the adjectival meaning of feeling of wanting to kill simply makes no sense in these
contexts.
A few days after submitting my reports and a day before Mr X was due to give
evidence, I received via the instructing solicitor a counter-report that Mr X had prepared
in response, at the behest of a police ocer. In it, he said that he concurred with my
opinion that killy had the alternative meaning of close friend. However, he said that in
his original report he had interpreted the word:
‘as short and brief as possible [the interpretation being sterile and almost binary one
to be objective] with impartiality and being as neutral as possible in mind. During
giving evidence would have been the correct opportunity and time to expand on
the wider meaning as I have done in this report for the Crown and Jury.’ (Mr X
counter-report, p.2)
Mr X labeled his original interpretation, the feeling of wanting to kill, as ‘sterile’, ‘binary’,
‘impartial’ and ‘neutral’. This contrasted with my interpretation, close friend. I will leave
it to the reader to determine which, if either, of these terms is the more ‘neutral’. Mr X
also asserts here that his decision to include just one possible interpretation of killy in
his original report was a justied one, and that he intended to elucidate when he entered
the witness box.
Let us remind ourselves of CrPR Part 19.4, particularly bullet (f), which states that
an expert’s report must:
(f) where there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the report—
(i) summarise the range of opinion, and
(ii) give reasons for the expert’s own opinion;
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Coupled with the omissions of compliance statements as detailed above, the lack of any
description of the full range of potential meanings of killy in Mr X’s original report
further calls its admissibility into question.
Mr X described my consultation of the sources urbandictionary.com and Twitter as
‘laughable’ and ‘subjective’ and suggested that it was my unfamiliarity with ‘the gangs
and street-based culture’ that necessitated my methods. Suce to say that building and
examining a mini-corpus of genuine language use by an online community which in-
cludes many members of the speech community under examination is a method that
substantially outweighs native speaker intuition in the validity stakes, and one that I
would have utilised even had I been fully conversant in UBE.
Mr X’s counter-report moves on to cite the work of Hallsworth and Young – after
some searching I established this as Hallsworth and Young (2006) (note the requirement
set out in CrPR19.4 (b) to give details of literature relied upon and Forensic Science
Regulator (2020b) elaboration that this should ‘include sucient detail to enable another
expert to identify the relevant document’ (para. 10.3.24)) – to explain a typology of urban
collectives widely accepted in the criminology community: ‘a] peer group, b] street gang
and c] an organised criminal network’ . He argued that if the group in question is merely
a ‘peer group’, for whom criminal activity is not central to their self-denition, then he
concurred with my interpretation of killy. If, on the other hand, the group is identied
as being a ‘street gang’, then Mr X disputes my interpretation, and instead favours killer
friend/the feeling of wanting to kill. This is the rst appearance of killer friend – up to this
point we had only seen Mr X interpret killy as the feeling of wanting to kill. It appeared
to me, and to the defence counsel, that killer friend had been added to bridge the gap
between Mr X’s original interpretation and mine .
Furthermore, the basis of the semantic dierentiation between ‘peer group’ and
‘street gang’ denitions is unclear, and particularly puzzling given the information pro-
vided by Mr X that peer groups ‘copy and imitate [gang] culture’ – strange that this
would not extend to their language use. Moreover, Mr X said that he had no knowl-
edge of the participants or their situation at the time of his analysis – no knowledge that
one of the speakers was speaking from prison where he was on remand having been
charged with a suspected gang-related murder. This raised the question of what led him
to attribute the ‘gang’ meaning of the questioned word rather than the arguably more
neutral ‘peer group’ meaning?
The defence team invited me to observe Mr X’s evidence, and for three full days I
logged in to the Crown Court’s online system to hear him being examined, cross ex-
amined, and re-examined. In the witness box, Mr X began by explaining that he ‘didn’t
need’ to consult any sources in ascertaining the meaning of the UBE items, because it
was ‘a second language’ to him. But it is widely noted in linguistics that native speaker
intuition about language is often markedly dierent from what we can observe in a cor-
pus of actual language use (e.g. Biber et al. 1998) – and that is if we accept that he is
indeed a ‘native speaker’. Mr X was cross examined on the matter of how he keeps his
understanding of ‘street slang’ current, given that his gang involvement dates back some
twenty years. His response was that his work with young people and his contact with
younger family members enabled this. ‘Are your family gang members?’ he was asked
– his negative response, of course, begging the question of how, if gang and non-gang
meanings attached to a particular lexical item are so dierent, his association with non-
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gang member family members could possibly qualify him to comment on the meaning
of a word by an alleged gang member.
On the matter of his original interpretation of killy, Mr X stated that in his report
he had ‘tried to keep it vague’, planning to elaborate during his oral testimony. It is
dicult to see how providing one interpretation of a word and then nine months later
(i) conceding it could have a completely unrelated, far less incriminating meaning and
(ii) adding a brand new third denition, could possibly be described as ‘elaboration’. The
opinion had undisputedly been completely transformed.
During his direct examination, the audio recordings of the telephone calls were
played to the court. In the transcript of the phone call that began ay yo yo my killy
do, one party questions the other about whether a particular event has taken place: you
know what I want to talk about. . . is it true? Receiving an armative answer, the speaker,
according to the transcript, responds shouting man fucking get in. The audio told a dif-
ferent story, which the judge himself pointed out: the speaker clearly responded my
fucking killy, not man fucking get in. Mr X concurred. If he had had access to the audio,
he reiterated, his interpretation would have been dierent. Mr X argued that this sec-
ond appearance of killy after the revelation of some act, presumably the fatal stabbing
at the centre of the trial, lent support to his interpretation killer friend (a possible mean-
ing that had not appeared until after Mr X had viewed my report). This reinforces a
point made by Grant and MacLeod (2020: 179) about the importance of an expert ‘learn-
ing to insulate oneself from the broader facts of the case. . . create a deliberate ignorance
in which a rigorous analysis can proceed without bias’. I counter-argued, if killy can
make an appearance both before and after the proclamation then the use of the word
is clearly not contingent on that proclamation. Speaker A refers to his friend as killy
long before there is any acknowledgement that this particular event has taken place.
The other point to be made here is that when commenting on linguistic issues for the
court, one should always request access to the original audio rather than working from
notoriously unreliable police transcripts (see Fraser 2020). As discussed earlier, seeking
access to signicant products is a requirement of expert witnesses stipulated in FSR CPC
(2021a).
As reported in Grant (2017), it requires little expertise to provide a ‘plain English’
gloss of ‘slang’ or patois items. As academic linguists we do not necessarily bring knowl-
edge of a specic variety to a case, but a rigorous methodology. In the killy case I was
not called to give evidence, which would have given me the opportunity to elaborate
on my methodology. Instead, defence counsel considered that the jury’s response to his
devastating cross examination of Mr X would suce, and the interests of justice (and
the public purse) could be served adequately without me.
Conclusions
A widely-cited aim for forensic linguistics is the use of language analysis to ‘improve the
delivery of justice’ (Grant and MacLeod 2020: 180), and I conclude here with thoughts
about how we might do so organised around some central questions that have transpired
from the current discussion.
Firstly, how can we expect jurors to weigh up not just two contradictory opinions,
but two wildly disparate methods for reaching those opinions? How can we expect them
to assess the validity of lived experiences as compared to empirical linguistic analysis,
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or as I have expressed it in the title of this paper, of expertise as an art: the consequence
of a perceived innate ability, or as a craft: the duplicable result of learned skills? Clearly
we need to strike the balance between judges’ understandable reluctance to assign dis-
proportionate credibility to certain professional organisations and methods, and juries’
need for a degree of guidance on what constitutes reliable expert evidence. This ques-
tion ties back to earlier discussion about how, if a jury has been deemed to require expert
testimony to assist with something outside of its normal knowledge and experience, it
can possibly make decisions about the reliability of said testimony when they hear it.
We can accept that sucient expertise can be gleaned from sources other than pro-
fessional or academic training, while nevertheless maintaining that witnesses claiming
to possess such expertise must have their methods scrutinised in the same way as ex-
perts who have followed the more traditional route. They must be subject to the same
rules, as set out in CrPR (2020) and CPD (2020), as experts such as the many among our
readership who have studied to doctoral level, honed their skills over many years, and
been part of a global community responsible for the rigorous empirical research that un-
derpins casework of this nature. It goes without saying that there can be no allowances
made for experts based on the grounds for their expertise – no easing of their obliga-
tions owing to their close working relationship with the police, and judicial scrutiny
of all listed expert witnesses is crucial. Such scrutiny could potentially be encouraged
through specially developed education schemes, or as recommended by the Law Com-
mission (2011), through published guidelines for the judiciary. As discussed above, Mr
X’s evidence failed to meet a number of legal requirements, and sucient critique from
the judge may well have led to it being excluded on those grounds.
How can we best strike the balance between assisting the jury in reaching its con-
clusion while preserving its role as trier of fact? I discussed above about the danger that
juries may focus on ‘perceived pointers to reliability (such as the expert’s demeanour or
professional status)’ (Law Commission 2011: 4). As experts, we must be careful not to
intimidate the jury when our legal obligation is to assist it. This is a phenomenon that
barristers are aware of – in the killy case defence counsel explicitly stated that he would
prefer not to call me, because in his experience jurors tend not to respond well to what
they perceive as attempts to ‘bamboozle’ them.
We have talked about the legal precedent for providing a semantically encoded slid-
ing scale of opinion, and about the formal requirement to do so as set out in FSR 2021b.
As Coulthard, Johnson & Wright point out, however, one issue with such scales is that
it is impossible to know if the jury are attaching exactly the same meaning to the scales
as the expert is; and furthermore, regardless of the expert’s tentativeness, the jury ulti-
mately have to make a binary decision about guilt (2017: 198). On this last point, and
echoing CrPR 19.2 (1) (a), it is the responsibility of the expert to restrict their opinion
to their own area of expertise – which does not encompass the guilt or otherwise of the
defendant. For example, in the killy case described above, an expert’s job is to comment
on the likelihood that each of the potential meanings was accurate, given the context
in which the word was used – not to select a denition based on one’s belief about the
speakers’ membership of a gang, with the centrality of criminality that that implies. As
soon as Mr X’s testimony strayed into this arena, it should have been struck from the
record.
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In the absence of a statutorily imposed test for admissibility it would appear that en-
gaging with judges on the matter of reliability in general, and empirical methods more
specically, would be one eective method for improving the standards of expert testi-
mony in England & Wales. This is an endeavour I hope to embark on with a syndicate
of other experts in the near future.
But there is also a wider solution that is the responsibility of all of us, whether or
not we undertake expert work. If solicitors, barristers, and most importantly judges
are largely unaware of the existence of disciplines like our own, it should scarcely be a
surprise that expertise based on highly questionable methods such as those of Mr X is
so easily admitted without question, and the threat of miscarriages of justice looms so
menacingly. The more visible forensic linguists, cultural scholars, and academics from
other lesser-known scientic disciplines are, the more level the playing eld becomes for
defendants. A concerted attempt by our disciplines to promote our craft in public fora
will inevitably lead to information seeping into the psyche of the legal profession, as
well as that of jurors who ultimately decide how much weight to assign to the evidence
they hear. We must be shameless self-promoters, taking every opportunity we can to
publicise our work – not simply in the interests of our disciplines themselves but in order
to alert the legal profession to our existence and our capacity to inform their practice.
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